Commander
Naval Surface Force

LtCol Paul Miner and Maj Bryan Delgado
COMNAVSURFOR
Combat Cargo

Waterfront Chain of Command

- CNSF=CNSL+CNSP a single surface TYCOM
- Retirement of the Amphibious Grou
- Emergence of the Expeditionary Str Groups
- Emergence of the Class Squadrons (CLASSRON)

FLEET FORCE COMMAND

SURFACE FORCES COMMAND

ADCON (FRTP)

CLASSRON (LSD/LPD 17)

ESG THREE

COMPHIBRON-ONE

COMPHIBRON-THREE

COMPHIBRON-FIVE

COMPHIBRON-SEVEN

ESG SEVEN (Japan)

COMPHIBRON-ELEVEN

SURFACE FORCES ATLANTIC

CLASSRON (LHA/D/LPD 4)

ESG TWO

COMPHIBRON-TWO

COMPHIBRON-FOUR

COMPHIBRON-SIX

COMPHIBRON-EIGHT

Waterfront Chain of Command

Waterfront Accomplishments

- **COMNAVSURFOR INST 4621.1/COMMARFORCOMO 4621.1/COMMARFORPAC 4621.1B completed on and on the street. Combined three Instructions/directives into one.**

- **Assignment of MCC to new or changed units. Some MCCs still remain with DECOM SHIPS.**

- **MARFORPAC is now in step with MARFORCOM when it comes to paying for MOGAS onload/offload and disposal cost (different process).**

- **Getting the CLASSRON's staffed and running**

Waterfront Priorities

- **LFORM instruction; CNSF 4080 Series editing is now with the MARFORs. Input is due back to CNSF NLT 27 Jun 08.**
- **MWCP 4-11(Combat Cargo Handbook) and MWCP 3-31 (Amphibious Ships and Craft pub) are currently being reviewed and analyzed for republication.**
- **SPI Computer Fielding:**
  - **LOGAIS common capabilities suite for the PhibRon's and the Ships submitted to TDIS.**
  - **A set of vehicle wheel scales will accompany the computers for each big deck and potentially for each LPD (decision pending).**

Waterfront Priorities cont..

- **Unauthorized ShipAlts:**
  - **Changes have been proposed and some made to accommodate the ESG's and the MEU staffs.**
  - **Annual SLCP validation, reporting variances.**
  - **C4I Baseline changes have a specific standards directed by HQMC; await Blue-Green approved all encompassing SCD.**
  - **Bottom-line; Uniform capabilities across the classes**

    of ships. Discipline needed in the Fleet Modernization Program. Ship Change Documents (SDC) should become the norm, not the exception.

Waterfront Priorities cont..

- **NAVY Staffs, NSE, and "other" units composition:**
  - **Need to review ESG staff and NSE requirements and footprint of supporting personnel/equipment.**
  - **NSE equipment requirements have changed with the Marine Corps over all expansion of equipment.**
  - **Riverine Units and STUAS (RPV) Units may deploy with future ESG deployments. Need to capture EDLs and logistical requirements afloat (like MOGAS usage…) that may impact the Marine Corps.**
  - **Bottom-line: We need a Navy Staff and NSE/Det base-line.**

Landing Force Equipment Impact on the Fleet

EFV

LVSR

MV22

JLTV (16k)

USMC Aircraft and Vehicle Growth



Increased Weights/Density Impact Deck Strength, Ships Stability…

***Vehicle weights provided by MCCDC and POE 50 reps, Aircraft weights provided by NAVAIR reps**

What that extra weight means…

Low KG



High KG



POSITIVE STABILITY

With positive stability, a ship will right itself.

NEGATIVE STABILITY

With negative stability, a ship will continue to roll over.

A High KG Results in Negative Stability…

"Future Naval Operations"

"…the *Naval* and *Marine Corps Operating Concepts* call for more widely distributed forces to provide increased forward presence, security cooperation with an expanding set of international partners, preemption of non-traditional threats, and a global response to crisis in spite of challenges to access. Collectively, these concepts provide the foundation for selectively conducting either distributed or aggregated operations." -CMC Posture Statement, March 2007

The Maritime Strategy "…must reflect the roles and missions we are expected to perform: in the war on terror, in conventional combat campaigns, in defense of the homeland, and in shaping and stability operations. It must strike a proper balance between the enduring requirements for traditional naval capabilities with those needed to squarely confront and influence the highly dynamic security environment of the 21st Century." -CNO Guidance for 2007, February 2007

Recent Applications of U.S. Amphibious Capabilit

101 in the past 25 years, covering the range of activities described in the national strategy.

- **88 conformed to the doctrinal types of amphibious operations:**
  - 6 Amphibious Assaults
  - 4 Amphibious Withdrawals
  - 3 Amphibious Demonstrations
  - 2 Amphibious Raids
  - 73 “Other Amphibious Operations” such as NEO (12) or HA/DR (26)
- **13 classified as “such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may direct”**



Amphibious Ship Requirement

CCDR Shaping & Crisis Response
Capable of all Naval missions: 2.5+ MEU/ESG
4 X GFS
Enabled by MPF(F) / connectors

Forcible Entry
2 MEB assault echelon
30 Amphib Ships
Reinforced by one MEB
1 x (MPF (F))
Sufficient AFOE



- Stated Amphibious Ship requirement: 30 operationally available to support a 2 MEB (AE) forcible entry
- 33 Ships provide necessary maintenance inventory but fail to meet CCDR competing demands for shaping and crisis response
- Need to examine alternatives to mitigate risk in providing 30 ships for the AE. Examples:
  - Increase amphibious ship inventory or
  - Reevaluate MPF (F) to have GFS role

Waterfront Personnel Issues

CWO3 or CWO4 on big decks; too many CWO2's now.

CLASSRON staffing with experienced CCO's; both gapped now.

Staffing new ships ~4 months prior to delivery; we aren't making that now, troop spaces are suffering.

Too many "Ship to PhibRon" or "Ship to Ship" tours; need new blood/everyone needs to have a shot at a sea tour.

CCO/CCA formal training; none now and it shows.